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Chapter 3     The Production of Subjectivity: 
From the Transindividual to the Commons 
Jason Read 
 
The current conjuncture is marked by a fundamental impasse in terms of how to 
engage the question of politics. This is in part due to the fact that the various figures through 
which one engages with politics, the citizen, worker, or militant, have become exhausted of their 
meaning; the citizen has been replaced by the interest group, the worker by the investor in his or 
her own human capital, and the militant by the terrorist. As Alain Badiou writes: 
 
This political subject has gone under various names. He used to be referred to as a 
‘citizen,’ certainly not in the sense of the elector or town councilor, but in the sense of 
the Jacobin of 1793. He used to be called ‘professional revolutionary.’ He used to be 
called ‘grassroots militant.’ We seem to be living in a time when his name is 
suspended, a time when we must find a new name for him.20 
 
Rather than work in the direction that Badiou supposes, finding a new name for the 
political subject, I would like to focus in this essay on the “production of subjectivity.” The 
“production of subjectivity,” the way which he which human beings are constituted as subjects, 
through structures of language and power, such a philosophical perspective is often seen as 
tantamount to a denial of political agency altogether, to the assertion that everything is an effect 
of power, that agency and action cannot exist. What I would like to propose is that far from 
being a theoretical dead end for politics the production of subjectivity is the condition for its 
renewal. It is only by examining the way in which subjectivity is produced that it is possible to 
understand how subjectivity might be produced otherwise, ultimately transforming itself, 
turning a passive condition into an active process.  The connection between work and politics 
that lies at the root of the Marxist project remains as valid as ever, but production needs to be 
expanded beyond the factory floor to include the production of subjectivity. 
As a philosophical perspective, or line of inquiry, “the production of subjectivity” is 
fundamentally disorientating, primarily because it forces us to treat something considered to be 
originary as produced, the cause and origin of actions as an effect of prior productions. The 
perspective cuts through the established binaries of philosophical thought, mingling effects with 
causes, material conditions with interior states, and objects with subjects. As an initial gesture of 
orientation I proposes that the production of subjectivity can at least be provisionally defined 
along two axes: that of base and superstructure and that of structure and subject. Rather than 
understand the work of Marx through the oft-cited figure of base and superstructure, in which 
the production of things and the reproduction of subjectivity are each given their place and 
degree of effectivity according to a hierarchical structure, it is perhaps more interesting to view 
his work through the intersection of a mode of production and a mode of subjection. This 
assertion gets its textual support through the multiple places where Marx addresses the 
prehistory of capitalism, the breakdown of feudalism and previous modes of production. It is not 
enough for capitalism to constitute itself economically, to exploit the flows of wealth and labor, 
but it must constitute itself subjectively as well, develop the desires and habits necessary for it to 
perpetuate itself.21 As Marx writes: “The advance of capitalist production develops a working 
class which by education[Erziehung], tradition, and habit[Gewohneit] looks upon the 
requirements of that mode of production as self evident natural laws.”22 Thus the production of 
                                                             
20 Alain Badiou Metapolitics. Trans. J. Barker (New York: Verso, 2005) pg. 102. 
21 Both of these axes are developed at greater length in my The Micro-Politics of Capital: Marx and the 
Prehistory of Capitalism (Albany: SUNY, 2003). 
22 Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Volume I. trans. Ben Fowkes. (New York: Penguin, 
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subjectivity demands that two facets of social reality, that of the constitution of ideas and desires 
and that of the production of things, must be thought of not as hierarchically structured with 
respect to each other, but fully immanent, taking place at the same time, and within the same 
sites. This is not to say, however, that the “production of subjectivity” is a pure subjection; 
subjectivity is not simply an effect of the economic structure, without its own specific causality 
and effects, effects that are even antagonistic to the demands of the economic structure. This 
combination of subjection and subjectivity can be understood by focusing on the two senses of 
the phrase, “the production of subjectivity,” as the simultaneous non-identity of the manner in 
which subjectivity is produced and the manner in which subjectivity is productive, not just in 
terms of value or wealth, but its general capacity to produce effects. The subject is at one and the 
same time an effect of the structure and in excess of its place. This can be seen to make-up the 
antagonistic logic of Marx’s Capital, from the discussion of the labor process to the struggle over 
the working day, at each step the subjects that capital produces, through training, education, 
and habit, produce a surplus of subjectivity, of desires and needs, that struggle against the very 
site of their constitution. As Marx famously wrote, “Men make history but they do not make it 
just as they please.” Finally, I should say, in a point that will be returned to, that there is 
admittedly an ambiguity with respect to the temporality, and historicity of this assertion 
regarding the simultaneous identity and non-identity of the mode of production and the 
production of subjectivity; as a concept it can be traced through all of Marx’s writings, appearing 
most strongly in the periods where the epochal transformations (from pre-capitalism to 
capitalism are addressed), but, as a problem, its particular provocation stems from the current 
conjuncture, from attempts to grasp the present according to the reality of real subsumption, in 
which it becomes increasingly difficult to draw the dividing line between culture and economy. 
 
From Gattungswesen to Transindividuality 
I have recapped these two aspects somewhat briefly only to introduce two other 
problems introduced by the production of subjectivity: namely, the relation of the individual to 
society and political subjectification. It is in relation to these problems that we see the difficulty 
of this orientation, its challenge to the existing ways of thinking, and its promise, its capacity to 
reorient thought. These two problems, that of a social ontology and politics, would at first glance 
appear to be not only distinct but distant from each other: the first being speculative and the 
second practical. However, they are inseparable, linked by the difficulty of imagining and 
envisioning forms of collectivity: a task that requires the creation of new modes of thought and 
the destruction of an individualistic ontology.  (The burden of this individualist ontology has 
weighed down theories of the production and constitution of subjectivity: imagining the 
production of subjectivity as an individualistic project of aesthetic self-fashioning or ironic 
distance from the conditions of production). Starting from the production of subjectivity means 
that first the subject, the individual, must be seen as produced, as an effect, thus the individual 
cannot be privileged as a given, as the irreducible basis of ontology, epistemology, and politics. 
Furthermore maintaining both senses of the genitive, that is the simultaneous non-identity of 
the way in which subjectivity is productive and produced, means that the subject can also not 
simply be seen simply as an effect of society. Thus, the two ways of understanding the relation 
between the individual and society, either starting from individuals as a given and 
understanding society as nothing more that the sum total of individuals, or, starting from 
society and seeing individuals as nothing more than effects of a larger structure, are barred from 
the outset. As Etienne Balibar has argued, these two conceptions, which could be named 
individualism and holism (or organicism), constitute much of the thought of the problem of 
society and the individual in western philosophy. 23  Thus, the political problem and the 
                                                             
1977) pg. 899 
23 Etienne Balibar, Spinoza: From Individuality to Transindividuality (Rijnsburg: Eburon, 1997) pg. 6 
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ontological problem prove to be if not the same at least similar; in each case it is a matter of 
thinking beyond the opposition of the individual and society, of moving beyond these starting 
points to grasp the productive nexus from which both individualities and collectivities emerge. 
Marx’s thought occasionally attempts to break with both of these options. I say 
occasionally because despite the fact that we could argue that Marx’s implied social ontology is 
consistently opposed to both a methodological individualism and a holism of the organic or 
functionalist variety, Marx only explicitly argues against these perspectives in those occasional 
moments where he reflects on his fundamental philosophical orientation. While Marx’s most 
sustained criticism was mobilized against the idea of the atomistic individual, that formed the 
basis of the “Robinsonades” of political economy, he also argued that presentations of the 
collective, such as spirit, the state, or even the population, were abstractions if considered apart 
from their constituent relations and divisions.24 At the core of Marx’s critique of political 
economy, from the early texts on alienation to Capital, is the idea that capital exploits not just 
individuals, but the generic and pre-individual conditions of subjectivity, what Marx referred to 
as species-being [Gattungswesen]. However, for reasons that more historical than philosophical, 
Marx considered this generic essence to be first and foremost one of labor, and labor understood 
specifically as the production of things through the work of the body and hands. Labor is the 
common, in part because it encompasses the biological basis of subjectivity, a sphere of material 
need constituting a biological individual prior to social or psychic individuation. Labor is not 
simply an anthropological constant, defining man’s metabolic relation with nature however, it 
encompasses skills, tools, and knowledge that are the products of history and social relations. 
Labor is mankind’s inescapable relation with nature and its constitution of a second nature.  
Labor constitutes and is constituted by habits, practices, and operational schema that traverse 
individuals, making up a social relation and a shared reservoir of knowledge. Marx’s clearest 
statement regarding capitalism’s exploitation of the collective conditions of subjectivity is in the 
chapter in Capital on cooperation. As Marx argues, when a large number of people are assemble 
in one place, such as a factory, the sum total of their productive activity exceeds that of the work 
of the same number of isolated individuals. As Marx writes, “When the worker co-operates in a 
planned way with others, he strips off the fetters of his individuality, and develops the 
capabilities of this species.”25 Exploitation is not of the individual, the alienation of what is 
proper to the individual, but is the appropriation of that which is improper, and only exists in 
relation. 
Despite the fact that Marx places this exploitation of the collective conditions of 
subjectivity at the center of Capital, he does not theoretically develop its conditions. Marx is in 
many respects quite nominalist regarding the cause of this social surplus; the reason why a 
group working together is necessarily greater than the sum of its parts.  
As Marx writes: 
 
Whether the combined working day, in a given case, acquires this increased 
productivity because it heightens the mechanical force of labor, or extends its sphere 
of action over a greater space, or contracts the field of production relatively to the 
scale of production, or at the critical moment sets large masses of labor to work, or 
excited rivalry between individuals and raises their animal spirits, or impresses on the 
similar operations carried on by a number of men the stamp of continuity and 
many-sidedness, or performs different operations simultaneously, or economizes the 
means of production by use in common…whichever of these is the cause of the 
increase, the special productive power of the combined working day, is under all 
circumstances, the social productive power of labor, or the productive power of social 
                                                             
24 Both of these points can be found in the “1857 Introduction” published in the Grundrisse. 
25 Karl Marx, Capital pg. 447. 
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labor.  This power arises from cooperation itself.  When the worker co-operates in a 
planned way with others, he strips off the fetters of his individuality, and develops the 
capabilities of this species [Gattungsvermögen].26 
 
 Marx enumerates all of the possible causes, from animal spirits to mass conformity, 
remaining equally open and equally indifferent to the various causes of cooperation. For Marx it 
is enough to say that man is a social animal, and leave it at that. Which is not to say that Marx 
remains completely silent as to the basis of collective existence. In his more speculative or 
theoretical moments, Marx also refers to the inorganic body as the basis of subjectivity.  In the 
first instance this inorganic body is nature itself, with which man is in constant metabolic 
interaction. but it also encompasses everything that serves as the precondition of production, 
tools, social relations, everything that appears to a new generation as given rather than 
produced. Thus the inorganic body is situated at the point of indistinction between nature and 
history.27 Moreover, these conditions are not just physical in the form of tools and natural 
conditions but encompass the mental preconditions of production as well.  Language is, as 
Marx reminds us, first and foremost a social product. Thus, if an irreducible mental component 
accompanies all labor, separating “the worst architect from the best of bees,” this mental 
component is irreducibly collective as well, composed of shared knowledge embodied in habits 
and practices.28 
 In different, but related ways, Balibar and Paolo Virno have suggested the term 
transindividuality, to grasp what Marx designates with the figure of the “inorganic body.” The 
term is drawn from the work of Gilbert Simondon, who interrogates the privilege that western 
thought has ascribed to the principle of individuation.29 For Simondon individuation has to be 
grasped as a process, in which the individual is neither the ultimate end nor absolute beginning, 
but a continual effect of an activity. There are multiple and successive individuations, physical, 
biological, psychic, and collective, each resolving the problems posed by the others, and 
transforming the fundamental terms of the relation. At the basis of Simondon’s understanding is 
a fundamental fact of existence, that Marx indicates (and Virno underscores): the very things 
that form the core and basis of our individuality, our subjectivity, sensations, language, and 
habits, by definition cannot be unique to us as individuals.30 These elements can only be 
described as pre-individual, as the preconditions of subjectivity. In some sense they do not even 
exist, at least as individual things, instead they make up a metastable condition, a flux of 
possibilities. Virno, following Simondon, outlines three different level of pre-individual 
singularities; the sensations and drives that make up the biological basis of subjectivity, 
language which constitutes its psychic and collective relations, and the productive relations, 
which constitute the historical articulation of the preindividual.31 The clearest example of what 
is at stake in designating these different activities and relations as preindividual can be seen by 
looking at the specific example of language. Language is irreducibly transindividual, there is, it 
is often said, no such thing as a private language, but it is also fundamentally preindividual, 
language is not made up of individual things, words, but of differential relations.32 Language 
exists only as a system of differences, as a metastable state, that is the precondition for any 
articulation, for any individual statement or utterances. Thus in general preindividual 
                                                             
26 Ibid. pg. 447 
27 Franck Fischbach, La production des hommes Marx avec Spinoza (Paris: PUF, 2005) pg. 56 
28 Karl Marx, Capital pg. 284 
29 Gilbert Simondon, L’individuation pg. 23. 
30 Paolo Virno, “The Multitude and the Principle of Individuation” Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 24 
2 (2003) 137. 
31 Paolo Virno, A Grammar of the Multitude: For an Analysis of Contemporary Forms of Life. Trans. I. 
Bertoletti, J. Cascaito, and A. Casson (New York: Semiotexte, 2004) Pg. 77. 
32 Paolo Virno, Multitude: Between Innovation and Negation (New York: Semiotexte, 2008) pg. 50 
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singularities exist as a differentially articulated set of relations, or possible relations. These 
preconditions are not simply the raw material of subjectivity, they are not completely 
transformed into a subject, but persist as unresolved potential along with the subject.33 There is 
always more to us than our putative identity as individuals, and it is only because of this that 
anything like collectivity, like social relations are possible. A completely autonomous and 
self-contained individual could not enter any relations.34 
 Society is not something standing apart from the individual, they are not two separate 
entities, for which the relation is always a fundamental problem. For Simondon 
transindividuality is not something that stands above the individual, rather it is nothing other 
than articulation of the individual. Individuals are individuals of the collective, of particular 
social relations and structures, just as collectives are nothing other than a reflection of the 
individuals that constitute them. Transindividuality is not the relation between two constituted 
terms, between the individual and society, but is a relation of relations, encompassing the 
individual’s relation to itself, the process of its psychic individuation, as well as the relation 
amongst individuals, and the relation between different collectivities. Transindividuality is in 
many respects an articulation of the pre-individual, as the habits, language, affects, and 
perceptions form the basis of a shared culture. The individual, the subject, has to be understood 
as the intersection of the pre-individual and transindividual, of the singular and the common.35 
The production of subjectivity, and its corollary concepts such as transindividuality and 
preindividual, entails not just a rethinking of that antinomy of the individual and the collective, 
but a new ontology and logic of thinking about the subject. The subject is a “social individual,” 
not just in the sense that he or she lives within society, but in the sense that individuality can 
only be articulated, can only be produced, within society.36 
 
From Transindividuality to the Common 
 he transformation of capital can be viewed as an increasing incorporation or 
subsumption of the production of subjectivity into capital, in terms of both the preindividual 
conditions and transindividual relations. Capital begins with formal subsumption, with labor 
power, which is initially taken as is, according to its traditional structure of technological and 
social development, but as capitalism develops it transforms this basic relation, separating the 
organic link between knowledge and work. In place of the organically developed habits, which 
connect the work of the hand with that of the head, capitalism interjects the combined 
knowledge of society, externalized in machines. At this point capital no longer simply exploits 
labor, extracting its surplus, but fundamentally alters its technical and social conditions as it 
subsumes all of society. Subsumption in this case crosses both sides of market relations, 
encompassing labor, which comes to involve the work of language, the mind, and the affects, but 
also the commodity form. If sensations, language, and habits or knowledge constitute the 
pre-individual backdrop of subjectivity, then it has to be acknowledged that much of what we 
sense, discuss, and do, comes to us in the form of commodities. It is from this perspective that 
we can grasp the ontological dimension of the first sentence of Capital, by inverting it: whatever 
appears does so as a commodity. This transformation of what appears has effects on subjectivity, 
as Marx reminds us, production not only creates an object for the subject, but a subject for the 
                                                             
33 In Simondon’s terminology the term “subject” is used to refer to the coexistence of the individual with 
pre-individual singularities and transindividual conditions. Simondon, L’individuation pg. 310. 
34 Gilbert Simondon, L’individuation pg. 298 
35 Paolo Virno, “Reading Gilbert Simondon,” Radical Philosophy 136 (March/April 2006) pg. 35. 
36 “In this transformation [the worker] is neither the direct human labor he himself performs, not the time 
during which he works, but rather the appropriation of his own general productive power, his understanding of 
nature and his mastery over it by virtue of his presence as a social body — it is in a word, the development of the social 
individual which appears as the great foundation-stone of production and of wealth.” Karl Marx, Grundrisse. 
Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy, Trans. Martin Nicolaus, (New York: Penguin, 1973) pg. 705.  
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object.37 Under commodity production, the production of private property, this entails a 
massive reduction of the sense of an object: “Private property has made us so stupid and 
one-sided that an object is only ours when we have it…”.38 The real subsumption of subjectivity 
by capital is articulated by two different productions of subjectivity, each defined by different 
economic sectors: in terms of production, there is a movement away from work as a solitary 
enterprise, the labor of a craftsman, to work that engages the knowledge and desire of humanity 
in general, while at the same time, on the side of consumption, there is a reduction of the world 
to what can be possessed, owned, viewed in the comfort of one’s home—a massive privatization 
of desire. Real subsumption is an increased exploitation of the transindividual and 
commodification of the preindividual. This division between production and consumption 
defines to some extent the paradox of social existence under contemporary capitalism: never 
have human beings been more social in their existence, but more individualized, privatized, in 
the apprehension of their existence. On the one hand, the simplest action from making a meal to 
writing an essay engages the labor of individuals around the world, materialized in commodities, 
habits, and machines, while on the other, everything, every social relation can be purchased as a 
commodity. In the Grundrisse Marx offers perhaps the most succinct definition of the paradox 
of the individual/collective in the early stages of capitalism.  
As he writes, 
 
“Only in the eighteenth century, in 'civil society', do the various forms of social 
connectedness confront the individual as a mere means towards his private purposes, 
as external necessity. But the epoch which produces this standpoint, that of the 
isolated individual, is also precisely that of the hitherto most developed social (from 
this standpoint, general) relations.”39 
 
 Both tendencies have only increased since the eighteenth century, as we have become 
simultaneously more connected and disconnected. The materialization of collective intelligence 
in machines produces new effects of isolation — “individualizing social actors in their separate 
automobiles and in front of separate video screens.” 40  Transindividual relations, the 
cooperation of multiple minds, bodies, and machines produce individuated and isolated 
perceptions. 
 From this thumbnail description of the current conjuncture it is possible to specify 
what is meant by the politics of the production of subjectivity. Politics bears directly on the 
preindividual and transindividual conditions of subjectivity, it is a matter of their distribution, 
presentation, and articulation. These conditions make up what could be called “the commons”; 
provided that the common is understood not simply as a passive given, a natural condition, as in 
the classic example of the pastoral commons, but as something that is both produced by 
subjectivity and productive of subjectivity.41 As we have seen in capitalism the common is 
divided, split between labor, which is reified in machines and structures, and consumption, 
which reduces it to a private object that is passively consumed. The political task must in some 
sense be one of the actualization or manifestation of the common. The problem is how to make 
the common, the transindividual and preindividual conditions of subjectivity, something other 
than the inchoate backdrop of experience, to make it something actively grasped, so that 
subjects can transform their conditions rather than simply be formed by them. To butcher a 
                                                             
37 Karl Marx, Grundrisse pg. 92. 
38 Karl Marx, The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844. Dirk Struik, trans. (New York: 
International, 1964) pg. 139 
39 Karl Marx, Grundrisse. pg. 223.  
40 Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire, (Cambridge: Harvard, 2000) pg. 322.  
41 Antonio Negri, “Kairos, Alma Venus, Multitudo,” in Time for Revolution. Trans M. Mandarini. (New 
York: Continuum, 2003) pg. 215. 
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phrase, it is necessary to think transindividuality as subject, rather than as substance. It is a 
matter of bringing the background, the plurality underlying language, sensation, and knowledge, 
into the foreground: transforming a passive condition into an actual production. The politics of 
the production of subjectivity is a question of the relation between a subject and the conditions 
of its production. 
 It is possible to interpret this political project as a matter of constituting a collective 
form of subjectivity against an individualized and isolated existence. This is often the tenor that 
this struggle takes in Marx; it is a struggle of the two productions of subjectivity. The market, or 
consumption, which produces not only a world as property, but individuals as possessors or 
consumers, whose relations are governed according to the fictions of ”freedom, equality, and 
Bentham,” and the factory, which produces and exploits a transindividual collectivity. While 
Marx’s general argument against “egoistic” man of civil society captures something essential 
about the social ontology underlying political economy and liberal political thought, it lapses 
into the interminable binary of the individual versus society. Which is to say that it makes it 
appear as if one could simply choose “individuality” or “collectivity” as an ethical value of 
individualism or solidarity. However, things are not that simple. It is not enough to oppose the 
collective to the individual, as the good to the bad form of subjectification. First, because as I 
have argued, ontologically, the individual, the subject, is nothing other than a modification of 
pre-individual conditions and transindividual relations. The social individual is not opposed to 
collectivity, but is it internal condition. There is a second more complex objection to such an 
opposition: equating the transindividual with the collective assumes that the former can be 
represented. Marx’s early criticism of the state in The German Ideology articulated a gap 
between the conditions productive of subjectivity and the representation of those conditions. 
The state is an “illusory communal life” based upon real ties of flesh and blood, language, and 
the division of labor.42 This rift between the conditions that are productive of subjectivity and 
the representation of those conditions is grounded on the connection between transindividuality 
and subjectivity. The relations that make up transindividuality are nothing more than 
preindividual conditions in a metastable state, a flux that is simultaneously productive and 
produced. (For example we could say that “a language” as much as it is the condition for any 
articulation, any style, it is simultaneously being transformed by the various jargons and slang.)  
Any representation of the transindividual, any representation of the collective, is a closure of 
this productive flux, taking a momentary and incomplete product as not only a goal but as a 
cause.43 
 If the transindividual cannot be represented, how can it be actualized? Answering such 
a question entails not only dispensing with the unstated connection between politics and 
representation, but also refining the very vocabulary we use to discuss social relations and their 
materialization in objects and structures. Virno argues that Simondon’s ontology makes possible 
a redefinition of the fundamental, but often vague and undefined, Marxist concepts of alienation, 
reification, and fetishization. 
As Virno argues: 
 
Reification is what I call the process through which preindividual reality becomes an 
external thing, a res that appears as a manifest phenomenon, a set of public 
institutions. By alienation I understand the situation in which the preindividual 
remains an internal component of the subject but one that the subject is unable to 
command. The preindividual reality that remains implicit, like a presupposition that 
conditions us but that we are unable to grasp is alienated.44 
                                                             
42 Karl Marx, The German Ideology. Trans. C.J. Arthur  (New York: International, 1970) pg. 53 
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Virno’s argument is in part based on a revalorization of reification, reification is the 
externalization of the preindividual, its articulation into a series of things, structures, and 
machines. The central point is that the “thing” in this case bears with it the relation and it is 
public, or at least potentially so, and thus exposed to the possibility of transformation and 
rearticulation. Virno’s fundamental example, or provocation, remains the “general intellect,” 
Marx’s term for the collective knowledge that is at once internalized in machines and dissipated 
across social space in the form of knowledges, habits, and ways of acting.45 In this instance the 
social dimension is inespacable and cannot be eradicated. This is fundamentally distinct from 
fetishization in which the qualities and attributes of social existence are attributed to a thing, 
echoing Marx’s classic formula in the social relation between men takes the form of a relation 
between things. “Fetishism means assigning to something — for example to money — 
characteristics that belong to the human mind (sociality, capacity for abstraction and 
communication, etc.)”.46 Thus, Virno returns the fetish to Marx’s earliest arguments about 
money, in which “money is the alienated ability of mankind.”47 Whatever quality or attribute I may 
lack, intelligence, attractiveness, strength, etc., can be purchased. Money scrambles the preindividual 
singularities, the fundamental elements of subjectivity, transforming them into things that can be 
purchased. Marx’s assertion of the “ontological” power of money intersects with Simondon’s notion of 
ontogenesis. It is thus no accident that Marx’s essay on the power of money in bourgeois society ends 
with a discussion of the individual: the world of money is juxtaposed to that of the irreplaceable 
individual, in which social qualities can only be exchanged for their similar qualities—if you want to be 
loved you must be capable of love, and so on. “Every one of your relations to man and to nature must be a 
specific expression, corresponding to the object of your will, of your real individual life.”48 
Returning to the paradox of modern existence addressed above, the socialized isolation, or 
what I referred to as the simultaneous exploitation of the transindividual and commodification of the 
preindividual, it is possible to argue that this relation constitutes a new sort of alienation, provided that by 
alienation we follow Virno in transforming our understanding of what this term means. Alienation, at least 
in the way that it has been understood as a generic watchword of various versions of Hegelian-Marxism, 
has been understood as a loss of self, a loss of subjectivity to the object. As such, the concept often 
uncritically reproduces the very individualistic ontology that Marx’s writing is mobilized against. 
However, as we have already indicated, it is not clear that Marx’s necessarily understood the concept in 
this way; alienation is not just loss of object, and control of activity, it is also alienation from 
species-being [Gattungswesen] from mankind’s universal nature, what could be referred to as the 
preindividual and transindividual components of subjectivity. As Virno argues, alienation is a separation 
from the conditions of the production of subjectivity; it is not a loss of what is most unique and personal 
but a loss of connection to what is most generic and shared. Franck Fischbach has argued, through a 
reading of Spinoza and Marx, the conventional definition of alienation needs to be turned on its head; 
alienation is not a loss of the subject, of subjectivity, but of objectivity, of a connection to the world. “To 
be alienated is the fact of being reduced to a subjective state, distinct and separate from the totality of the 
objective world…”.49 The commodification of the preindividual is such an alienation due to the fact that 
the basic components of our subjectivity, language, habits, perceptions, come to us in a prepackaged from, 
as things which can only be passively consumed. The milieu of our existence, preindividual and 
transindividual, becomes something we are passively subjected to, something consumed, not something 
that we can act on or transform, a condition that cannot be conditioned. 
If alienation best describes the commodification of the preindividual, or vice versa, 
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then what could best describe the exploitation of the transindividual? Answering this question is 
difficult because it cuts through the distinction that Virno makes between fetishism and 
reification as two ways of presenting the transindividual. Fetishism and reification both deal 
with the relationship between sociality and things, things that are not opposed to subjectivity, to 
the constitution of the individual, but its condition. With the fetish the thing stands in for the 
relation, while in reification the thing is the relation. Virno’s generalization of the problem of 
fetishization makes it possible to return to Marx’s critique of the state, which is primarily a 
critique of the representation of collectivity, of sociality itself, through a seemingly extraneous 
detour: Deleuze and Guattari’s reworking of Marx’s critique of capital. Deleuze and Guattari, in 
their inventive reading of Marx, have generalized this critique of the state into an examination of 
the way in which every society represents its historical conditions. In every mode of production, 
in every production of subjectivity, there is a unproductive element, a representation of the 
social order itself, what Deleuze and Guattari call a full body, that appropriates the social forces 
of production. It is an effect that appears as a cause. 
As Deleuze and Guattari write: 
 
…the forms of social production, like those of desiring production, involve an unengendered 
non-productive attitude, an element of anti-production coupled with the process, a full body 
that functions as a socius.  This socius may be the body of the earth, that of the tyrant, or 
capital.  This is the body that Marx is referring to when he says that it is not the product of 
labour, but rather appears as its natural or divine presuppositions.  In fact, it does not restrict 
itself merely to opposing productive forces in and of themselves. It falls back on [il se rabat 
sur] all production, constituting a surface over which the forces and agents of production are 
distributed, thereby appropriating for itself all surplus production and arrogating to itself both 
the whole and the parts of the process, which now seem to emanate from it as a quasi-cause.50 
 
Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of the socius expands upon Marx’s concept of the 
inorganic body; it each case it is a matter of the preconditions of production, the material, 
intellectual, and social conditions that appear as given. What Deleuze and Guattari underscore, 
however, is that this full body appears as given, the socius is a representation of the conditions 
of production. The historically produced conditions of production, the technical and social 
conditions, including the political structure, appear as something given rather than produced, as 
divine preconditions. This full body constitutes a particular representation of community, based 
on a condition of belonging: the lines of filiation or descent that determine a clan; custom and 
tradition that defines a culture: or language and birth that constitutes a nation. Society itself 
exists as a fetish, or rather it is fetishized to the extent that what is produced, the despot, etc., 
appears to be the cause of production, rather than its effect. As Deleuze writes, “The natural 
object of social consciousness or common sense with regard to the recognition of value is the 
fetish.”51 
In this series of full bodies capital functions as something of an exception. As Marx 
argues in the Grundrisse, capitalism is fundamentally different from all previous modes of 
production because in it production is not subordinated to the reproduction of a particular mode 
of existence. Whereas in the previous modes of production, production, the creation of wealth, 
was always subordinated to reproduction, to the maintenance of particular structures of 
authority, particular forms of subjectivity, in capital wealth is subordinated only to itself, to the 
production of more wealth. As Marx writes: “In bourgeois economics-and in the epoch of 
production to which it corresponds-this complete working-out of the human content appears as 
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a complete emptying out, this universal objectification as total alienation, and the tearing down 
of all limited, one-sided aims as sacrifice of the human end-in-itself to an entirely external 
end.”52 To place this back in the terms of Virno, the fetish is no longer a particular full body, a 
particular condition of social belonging, but it becomes an abstract object, money, or capital 
itself. As we have seen money is nothing other than the alienation of human potential; it is 
everything human beings can do, everything human beings can desire, represented in the form 
of an object, a universal equivalent that is nothing other than the materialization of this abstract 
power itself. There is thus a connection between fetishization and alienation, between the 
separation from the constitutive conditions, and their projection onto an object. As Marx writes, 
“All the powers of labor project themselves as powers of capital, just as all the value-forms of the 
commodity do as forms of money.”53 This tendency increases with the real subsumption of 
society, the more production is distributed across society, the more it appears as if capital itself 
is productive. 
In order to understand capital it is necessary to retreat to the misty realm of fetishism, 
but it is also necessary to understand how capital fundamentally transforms this relation—there 
is a fundamental difference between the fetishization of the despot and the fetishization of 
commodities. In the first instance the object in question represents the productive powers of 
society, the despot stands as a precondition of the labors of society, while in the second the 
object does not so much represent these powers, giving them a concrete instance, a full body, as 
it operates through them. Money does not represent anything, or rather what it represents is 
only pure abstract potential, social power in the abstract, it is the capacity to buy anything, to 
become anything, a social power. Deleuze and Guattari express this difference, between the 
representational and functional full body, as being between code and axioms. Codes set up a 
relation between actions and desires, actions and perceptions, “relations between flows,” in 
Deleuze and Guattari’s terms. To draw on the social ontology that we have been developing here, 
we could say that codes are a particular articulation of the preindividual conditions for 
subjectivity, a particular organization of the transindividual. What is essential is that these codes 
in attaching themselves to a particular full body ascribe a particular meaning to these practices, 
situating them within a religion, a nation, a culture, a way of life. Codes can be thought of as 
tradition, or prescriptions and rules bearing on the production and distribution of goods, 
prestige, and desire. As such they are inseparable form a particular relation to the past—a 
relation of repetition. This is fundamentally distinct from axioms that are quantitative rather 
than qualitative; in capitalism a thing, a practice, a desire, does not mean anything, or a rather 
its meaning is subordinated to the fundamental question as to how much money can be made. 
As Deleuze and Guattari write: “your capital or your labour capacity, the rest is not 
important…”.54 Axioms do not repeat or venerate the past, but are fundamentally flexible, it is 
always possible to add new axioms to the system, to open more markets. In each case, the 
productive powers of mankind, the transindividual is fetishized, transformed into the attribute 
of an object. However, there is a fundamental difference, the pre-capitalist object, the full body 
subject to the domination of a code, is more restrictive, tying the transindividual to a particular 
condition of belonging, a tradition, a tribe, a nation, while the capital is fundamentally open, the 
productive power of social relations appears, but appears as the attribute of an object, of money 
or capital. 
Deleuze and Guattari’s understanding of codes and axioms (and the relational social 
ontology they imply) brings us close to Marx’s fundamental dialectical point with respect to 
capitalism: that in capitalism the fundamentally productive power of mankind, of 
transindividuality, comes close to appearing as such. Capital strips away the illusions that 
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masked exploitation under religious or political guises. As Marx famously wrote in The 
Communist Manifesto: 
 
Constant revolutionizing of production, uninterrupted disturbance of all social 
conditions, everlasting uncertainty and agitation distinguish the bourgeois epoch 
from all earlier ones. All fixed, fast frozen relations, with their train of ancient and 
venerable prejudices and opinions, are swept away, all new-formed ones become 
antiquated before they can ossify. All that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is 
profaned, and man is at last compelled to face with sober senses his real condition of 
life and his relations with his kind.55 
 
Capital, in its ceaseless revolutionizing of the conditions of production, exposes the 
produced nature of sociality as such. In Alain Badiou’s terminology, capital constitutes a 
desacralization of the social bond.56  But Deleuze and Guattari add to this process something 
that Marx did not grasp in his identification of capitalism with ceaseless modernization: the 
production of new territories, new islands and representations of belonging. What once existed 
as code, as an object of collective belief and evaluation, as a full body, is reborn as a private 
object. The religions, cultures, and practices of the world are reborn as private objects of 
consumption: all the world’s cultures and all the world’s beliefs can be enjoyed in privacy of ones 
own home, Buddhism, Native American Spirituality, etc., As Deleuze and Guattari argue 
capitalism is “a motley painting of everything that has ever been believed.”57 These private 
beliefs are made possible by the fact that subjectivity is produced not through the codes of 
culture, but through the commodity, which is by definition cut off from and conceals its 
constitutive conditions, masking the labor in its production. Once they are separated from their 
different codes, and cultures, there is no contradiction between the different cultures, beliefs, 
values and ideals occupying the same space of the market. As Peter Sloterdijk illustrates the 
materialization of this indifference: 
 
The best prep school for Capital—would it not consist in watching television several 
hours a day, looking through several newspapers and magazines the remaining hours, 
and continuously listening to the radio? …We live in a world that brings things into 
false equations, produces false sameness of form and false sameness of values 
(pseudoequivalences) between everything and everyone, and thereby also achieves an 
intellectual disintegration and indifference in which people lose the ability to 
distinguish correct from false, important from unimportant, productive from 
destructive—because they are used to taking the one for the other.58 
 
The world becomes a private affair, to be consumed in the privacy of one’s home. 
Transindividuality is fetishized, made to appear in the form of the abstract and indifferent 
quantities of money, which transform it into an impersonal force, while simultaneously being 
commodified into a proliferating series of private objects. 
 From this perspective we can grasp the full extent of the third of Virno’s redefinitions, 
reification. Transindividuality is reified when it becomes a public thing. Virno’s example of this 
is as we have seen Marx’s concept of the “general intellect,” the collective powers of intelligence, 
distributed across the machines and subjects of social space, which contemporary production 
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depends upon. Like money, or capital, “the general intellect” embodies the collective powers of 
society, but it does so in a fundamentally different way, rather than being displaced onto an 
object, such as money. With the general intellect the collective powers of society are displaced on 
a series of objects and relations, the machines and habits that make up the productive relations 
of society. As Virno argues one of the defining characteristics of the general intellect is that the 
rules and norms which govern collective life are constantly being rewritten and transformed, 
new codes, new knowledges, new styles, etc., exposing the contingency and artificiality of public 
existence. This contingency cuts both ways. First, it disengages transindividuality from a fixed 
object, from a repetition of the past, it becomes a pure differential force. This force only appears 
through money, or the market, constituting a “publicness without a public sphere.” The market 
is entirely public, providing the structures that make up collective existence, but it is so in such a 
way that they cannot be touched, cannot be acted upon; its laws operate as is they were 
self-evident natural laws. Second, and in an opposed manner, it unmoors human activity from 
any norm, from any criteria. As much as money can be denounced as a fetish, as an alienation of 
human activity and powers, as a real abstraction it still imposes an equivalent on the disparate 
activities and practices, equal must be exchanged for equal. As the general intellect moves to the 
front of the production process, and the contingency and groundlessness of rules and operating 
procedures is dominant, the standard of equality disappears. This gives rise to a fundamentally 
ambivalent situation.  
As Virno writes: 
 
When the fundamental abilities of the human being (thought, language, self-reflection, 
the capacity for learning) come to the forefront, the situation can take on a disquieting 
and oppressive appearance; or it can even give way to a non-governmental public 
sphere, far from the myths and rituals of sovereignty.59 
 
There is a possibility of a resurgence of personal forms of dependence, as individuals 
sell their talents, perceptions, knowledge, and subjectivity (including preindividual singularities) 
rather than just labor power, then all of the individual, and not just the capacity to labor, is 
subject to domination. The work of real subsumption, work that utilizes capacities to think 
create and interact, is not isolated in time or space, making exploitation coextensive with 
existence. Exploitation is no longer organized around the abstract entities of labor and money, 
but encompasses all of existence. At the same time the collective production of norms of 
knowledge and action makes possible a new politics, one that liberates the collective from the 
various full bodies that attempt to represent it, what Virno calls a nongovernmental public 
sphere but what has historically been known as “the common.” The reification of 
transindividuality, its physical instantiation in practices, machines, and habits, makes possible a 
new understanding of collectivity, not as an amorphous mass to be represented, but as a 
multitude that acts and cannot be separated from its acting. 
The political question is not a matter of looking for “the subject” capable of 
transforming the existing political conditions, something that could play the role of the 
proletariat, the gravedigger of the existing society. Rather, in turning our attention to the 
production of subjectivity, to the pre-individual conditions and transindividual relations that 
constitute subjectivity, it is possible to recognize the subjections that make up the present, the 
fetishization of mankind’s abstract transformative potential in the form of money, and the 
alienation of subjectivity in the commodities that make up our daily existence. Moreover, it is 
also possible to see in the present conditions of the production of subjectivity lines of liberation, 
namely the possibility of a public that is no longer constituted around a fetishized full body, of 
the nation, the state, but is open to its own innovation and productive transformation. 
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Comment on Jason Read 
Takashi Satoh 
 
 
1. The principle of individuation in Simondon and subjectivation in Lacan 
 
According to Simondon, the process of individuation has two moments. First, it is “the 
pre-individual conditions” out of which the individuality has to emerge. Second, it is the 
“transindividual” relationship that creates an inter-human relation. The former should not be 
completely transformed into a subject, but always remains as residual.  The latter is the 
condition for the articulation of the individuality. 
This process of individuation in Simondon is similar in structure to the graph of desire 
in Lacan.60 
 
S  S': the signifier’s chain vector 
∆  $: the subject’s intention vector 
Triangle (∆): The pre-linguistic, pre-symbolic mythical subject (which will vanish in 
the succeeding graphs) 
Barred S ($): the divided, split subject 
 
This graph of desire, called elementary cell, can be interpreted as the subjectivation. 
The horizontal line represents the diachronic signifier’s chain; the horseshoe-shaped line 
represents the vector of the subject’s intentionality, each of which has direction. This indicates 
that discourse (S  S') and the production of the subject (Triangle  Barred S) are always in 
motion. 
Triangle  Barred S vector can be regarded as the individual that steps out of the 
pre-individual through the individuation, because both the individual and the subject have some 
common features. They are produced retroactively, and are not constituted completely. In each 
case, the process of the subjectivation and the individuation comes first, and the state of the 
subject and the individual is produced backward. 
On the other hand, it seems reasonable to suppose that the S  S' vector should be 
discussed along with the transindividual. The S  S' diachronic signifier’s vector is quilted or 
anchored in le point de capiton, interpreted as the Other, which is located at the right 
intersection of the vectors. It permits the signified which is located at the intersection on the left. 
The symbolic order is structured through these processes. Therefore this vector has the 
intersubjective and unstable feature.61 
It will follow from what has been said that the theory of the individuation is the 
procedure of the discursive analysis just like the graph of desire. This insight leads to a 
controversial point: in the individuation theory, there is no instance of the Real. The Real makes 
the symbolic order inconsistent, and there is the leftover that cannot be integrated into symbolic 
order. This difference is reflected in some statements, for example, it is said that “any 
representation of the transindividual, any representation of the collective, is a closure of this 
[transindividual] productive flux.” When we take the instance of the Real into account, this 
statement should be said that any representation conceals the impossibility of a closure of this 
productive flux. It may be that the production of subjectivity needs to take the Real into 
consideration. 
                                                             
60 See Lacan's Ecrits: “The Subversion of the Subject and the Dialectic of Desire in the Freudian 
Unconscious,” and also see Zizek’s The Sublime Object of Ideology, Chapter 3. 
61 Note that the floating signifier cannot be closed or fixed tightly and perfectly, it can be only quilted or 
tacked partially. 
 58 
 
2. The lack of formal subsumption by capital 
 
The real subsumption is articulated as two phases. One is an exploitation of the 
transindividuality in the phase of production, and the other is a commodification of the 
pre-individual in the phase of consumption. 
But it is doubtful whether this articulation is accurate. In my opinion, the 
commodification is more closely related to the formal subsumption than to the real one. Briefly 
speaking, the formal subsumption is about the integration of non-capitalist mode of production 
(or, a capitalist outside) through the commodification of labor-power.62 It is to be noted that the 
activities of the worker, whether before or after the formal subsumption, might be exactly the 
same. The difference between before and after the formal subsumption is that the labor-power is 
commodified and exchanged in the labor market. 
As much as the idea of the pre-individual is accepted, it must be said that 
“commodification of the pre-individual” is not the real subsumption but the formal one. 
Similarly, the statement that “consumption is individual” should be modified. More precisely, 
not consumption but circulation should be individual. 
These small adjustments may lead to a large disputation: if we admit the existence of 
the formal subsumption in the modern world, we also admit the existence of the outside of 
capital. Is there still outside left in this world under the age of globalization?  I’d like to leave 
this question open. 
 
3. Whose subjectivity? —The subjectivity of capital and the task of politics 
 
In several passages of Capital, Marx says that capital is Subject: For example, in the chapter IV 
“The General Formula for Capital,” Marx regarded capital as “an automatic subject,” “the subject 
of a process,” the “dominating subject.” This means that people are not the subjects of capitalist 
production but capital. And more importantly, capital can handle the production of subjectivity. 
Transindividuality of capital(s) is interpreted as “the language of commodities” in the market, in 
short, the price mechanism. The condition of pre-individual is interpreted as money, 
commodities and labor. In this case, individuation is related to the transformation of money into 
capital. But capital should not be completely transformed into a subject, but always remains as 
residual. Why? 
We almost reach the core of the subjectivity of capital. That residual can be considered 
as the labor-power.63 This residual makes the subjectivity of capital inconsistent even if “it is 
integral to the definition of capital.” The labor power is, therefore, the outside of capital 
although it is internalized. Commodification of labor-power is an attempt to suture what is 
ultimately unsuturable. 
This paradoxical logic can be explained by the Lacanian terminology: “$ <> a”. The 
barred S indicates the subjectivity of capital, and objet petit a (object little-a) denotes the 
labor-power as commodity. It is a hard core which resists commodification, and it is present 
only in a series of effects. 
It is worth emphasizing two points here. First, labor-power is recognized as object 
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from the perspective of capital. Therefore the politics of the production of subjectivity should 
focus attention on the problem of object. Second, even if the labor-power is object, it is not a 
capitalistic order-taker. Rather, it makes capitalism antagonistic. Antagonism prevents a closure 
of the capitalism. But capital tries to suture this unsuturability. In this sense, commodification 
of labor-power by capital is not a normal activity to obtain an achievable universality. It is rather 
the obsessional drive of capital to conceal the failure of capturing the totality. I may have to say 
that economics is inseparable from the commodification of labor-power. 
